Population and Agricultural Development by James Roumasset
  1




Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa 
 
 
Working Paper No. 07-2 





Thinking about population as a driver of agricultural development provides insights into 
induced technical and institutional change, whether it be Esther Boserup’s declining 
fallow period, modern crop varieties, or the specialization pyramid that arises in labor-
intensive agriculture. The non-convexities of research and development, infrastructure 
investments, and specialization imply that modest population pressure does not 
necessarily exert downward pressure on wages. As agricultural growth stimulates 
industrialization, the non-convexities of specialization become ever more compact. The 
combination of these and the increased demand for human capital, if not inhibited by 
policy failures, tends to promote a virtuous circle of human progress. 
 
JEL classification: J10, O12, O43, P23, Q01 
 
Keywords: population, agricultural development, Boserup, non-convexities, 
specialization, institutional change 
 
Corresponding Author: James Roumasset, Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 








                                                 
1To appear in the Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, London: Macmillan, 2007. I wish to thank, without 
any pejorative implication, Julian Alston, Kimberly Burnett, Richard Green, Alex McCalla, Alan Olmstead, 
and Sittidaj Pongkijvorasin. 




That economics became known as the ‘dismal science’ can largely be attributed to 
the theory of population and agricultural growth as developed by Malthus and Ricardo, 
notwithstanding the term’s origin in another context. Starting from a point of relatively 
high wages, for example at the end of the Black Death in Europe, or after some 
exogenous technological improvement, population increases geometrically. The 
additional population is assimilated by agricultural growth at the extensive and intensive 
margins, both of which result in diminishing returns to labor. Extensive growth occurs 
through the expansion of cultivated land, which Ricardo (1817) presumed to be more 
distant from or of poorer quality than land already in use. Growth at the intensive margin 
likewise results in diminishing returns, due to the greater amount of labor and other 
inputs employed on the fixed quantity of previously cultivated land. As a consequence, 
Ricardo (1817) and Malthus (1798) theorized that wages would eventually decline 
towards a subsistence level, where population growth would cease due to ‘positive 
checks’ such as starvation and disease.  
Modern economists still use this dismal theory to explain why growth in levels of 
living among the working classes was never sustained for long periods until the advent of 
the Industrial Revolution. Each technological improvement was subsequently ‘eaten up’ 
by population growth and the subsequent diminishing returns. The belief in this theory is 
so strong that Lucas (2002, ch. 3) wrote that he could look at a picture of a Korean 
peasant farm in an unknown century and confidently guess household income. Recent 
interest in ‘sustainable development’ has augmented resource pessimism. In this view, 
the conventional Malthusian vicious circle between population growth and poverty is 
exacerbated by resource depletion and environmental degradation. Expanding numbers of 
poor people in developing countries put more pressure on limited natural resources and 
fragile ecosystems, and the falling resource base makes the Malthusian circle even more 
vicious than with a fixed resource endowment.  
Malthus famously argued that unchecked population growth is exponential while 
food production at best grows linearly, thus implying the inevitability – in the absence of   3
sufficient preventative checks – of positive checks such as pestilence, plague, famine and 
war and of subsistence levels of income in the long run. Ironically, food supply has 
outstripped population growth ever since the publication of Malthus’s Essay on the 
Principal of Population. Technological and institutional change has been more rapid than 
he envisioned and preventative checks more robust. 
 
Boserup effects 
Boserup (1965; 1981) takes a different tack by taking population growth as the 
exogenous variable and enquiring into the consequences thereof for agricultural 
technology and institutional change. I follow Boserup’s lead in most of what follows, 
eventually returning to a more integrated view. Boserup focused on the effects of 
physiological population density on an additional intensive margin – the fallow period. 
As population (and other demand factors) grow, the predominant agricultural system 
gradually transitions from long to short fallow to annual cropping to multiple cropping. 
Table 1 describes these systems and illustrates the rough correspondence between the 
frequency of cropping and population density in less developed economies. Other authors 
have extended the correlation between population density and cropping frequency to 
European countries, both over time and country. 
 
Table 1  Boserup’s frequency of cropping by population density  
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fields each year without any fallow  200–300%  ≥ 256  Very dense 
Source: Boserup (1981, pp. 9, 19 and 23). 
 
Boserup’s insight can be partly understood from the perspective of induced 
technical change (Ahmad, 1966). Absent industrial growth, population pressure makes 
land increasingly scarce relative to labor, thus inducing land-saving technical change. In 
the era of modern economic growth, the same tendency would influence whether capital 
was used to save labor or land. This was exemplified by labor-abundant Japan developing 
land-saving biological innovations and the United States developing labor-saving 
mechanical innovations (Hayami-Ruttan, 1985). As represented with standard 
neoclassical analysis, however, induced innovation simply increases the elasticity of 
factor substitution (especially between land and labor). In the very long run, that is, 
allowing for induced technical change, the elasticity of substitution, such as between land 
and labor, is higher than without technical change. 
Similarly, decreasing the fallow period allows the marginal product to decline 
more slowly than otherwise. For example, suppose that 100 workers cultivate 100 
hectares with a 50 per cent cropping frequency (short fallow) and that the population 
doubles. Even though the additional labor can be productively employed, for instance by 
better weeding and more thorough land preparation, the marginal product of labor will 
suffer a large decline if the cropping frequency remains unchanged (perhaps by a half or 
more). By switching to annual cropping, however, it may be possible to accommodate the 
additional labor with only a small decline in its marginal product, even in the steady state. 
The optimal solution involves some conservation of soil fertility over time, for example 
through the use of animal manure and crop rotation (Barrett, 1991). 
Boserup contends that it is even possible that population pressure increases the 
productivity of agricultural labor. More intense farming systems require more fixed costs. 
For example, forest fallow systems require minimal land preparation. The slash and burn 
method leaves the land both fertile and weed-free. In the tropical African context that she 
describes, however, once the land has been burned and cropped, it is taken over by 
grasses and is no longer suitable for slash and burn agriculture until 20 or more years 
later, when the forest has returned. Consequently, land preparation requires time-  5
intensive ploughing. Because of these fixed costs, the average product of labor rises over 
some range.  
Other investments associated with intensification, such as irrigation and terracing, 
similarly increase labor productivity. This is illustrated in Figure 1.  Once population has 
reached point C, the average product of the extensive and intensive techniques is 
equalized and it becomes worthwhile to switch to the intensive method. As labor 
increases beyond C, the average product rises until D, where diminishing returns just 
offset the gains from spreading the fixed costs, and average product begins to decline. In 
this sense, population eventually overcomes the transitory gains from switching 
techniques and causes productivity to fall. 
 
Figure 1  Average product of labor under different farming techniques  
 
 
ource: adapted from Krautkraemer (1994). 
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Innovation-through-intensification, as portrayed in Figure 1, does not require invention. It 
is as if new techniques are taken ‘off the shelf’ when they are warranted by increased 
land scarcity. Genuinely new technology, developed through invention or imported from 
other areas, may provide additional positive effects. The same population increase that 
warrants the fixed cost of intensification also warrants increased expenditures on 
experimentation and research. This research shifts the innovation possibility frontier 
(IPC) between land and labor inwards. In modern settings, R&D becomes an important 
source of productivity growth. 
For example, the high-yielding, or modern, wheat and rice varieties (MVs) 
developed in the 1960s were in large part induced by population pressure on increasingly 
scarce land. In the extensive phase of agricultural development, cultivated hectarage is 
increasing. Eventually, cultivated area reaches a maximum and declines as towns and 
industrial areas encroach on agricultural land. At this point, land scarcity is exacerbated 
by both rising food demand and falling land supply, and intensification accelerates. 
One of the effects of intensification is to increase the demand for land-saving 
technology. According to the ‘political Boserup effect’ (Evenson, 2004), increasing 
population densities induce countries to invest more in the genetic improvement of both 
crops and animals. By first characterizing existing technology by the unit requirements of 
land, labor, and capital, optimal investment by a country in new technology can be 
described by the amount of research and its factor-saving bias. In one version of this 
theory, a given research expenditure allows a country to pick any point on the IPC, the 
envelope of all unit isoquants in the land–labor plane, that said research expenditure 
affords. If it is assumed that the IPC shifts in a neutral fashion towards the ultimate IPC, 
wherein the marginal benefit of research is zero, then the factor-saving bias is in 
accordance with changes in relative factor prices. For example, if population growth 
results in a decrease in the wage rate and an increase in the land rental rate, both relative 
to the price of capital, then technical change will be land-saving and labor-using relative 
to capital (Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978, chs 2 and 4). 
Inasmuch as the IPC shifts in a non-neutral fashion, however, these results will be 
modified. It is natural to assume, for example, that technical change is inherently capital-
using, that the unit isoquant (net of capital costs) can be shifted inward more cheaply by   7
increasing capital per unit of output than by increasing labor or land. Moreover, it may be 
that inventing technology that uses capital to save labor is cheaper than technology that 
saves on land. This may explain why the modern rice and wheat varieties have been 
found to be mildly labor-saving, in addition to being land-saving and capital-using 
(fertilizer responsive), even though their demand was created by falling wages relative to 
land rents. But even though labor per unit of output fell, output per hectare increased 
enough such that MVs had a positive effect on wages (for example, Evenson, 1982).  
Overall, MVs have had a beneficial effect on poverty reduction by decreasing food prices 
and increasing wages relative to what they would have otherwise been given population 
growth and labor demand in other sectors. 
Boserup’s other ‘secondary effects’ of population growth may also cause 
productivity to rise, even in the absence of agricultural research. Among these are 
property rights, work habits, division of labor, education, and the infrastructure for 
transport and communication. Changing property rights exemplifies how institutions can 
change in response to population pressure and other changes in factor scarcities. This 
insight led to the theory of induced institutional change as a complement of the theory of 
induced technical change. For example, as population pressure increased the demand for 
land-saving investments, private property sometimes emerged as a more efficient 
substitute for top-down land management by community leaders or feudal lords (see, for 
example, North and Thomas, 1973). Indeed, the first legal enforcement of the early 
English enclosures was effected by the Statute of Merton (1235), which noted the need to 
improve the land in order to generate greater rent.  The subsequent waves of English 
enclosures beginning before the 17th and 19th centuries also appear to have followed 
increases in the rate of population growth, although the timing is not without dispute. 
 
Population induced specialization in agriculture 
While population growth potentially augments the benefits of private property, 
potential efficiency gains do not automatically induce institutional change. In particular, 
rent seeking may lead to a ‘race’ such that private property is created before it actually 
increases efficiency (Lueck, 1998). On the other hand, political costs may retard 
institutional change beyond the time that its benefits warrant. The advent of private   8
property in Hawaii in 1848 was exceptional in two regards. First, the benefits of private 
property resulted from the increased profitability of sugar and pineapple production, even 
in the face of population decline. Second, the timing of private property accorded roughly 
with its efficiency benefits; the delaying effects of the political costs of change were 
offset by the expediency of governmental land sales.  
A more profound institutional change that may be induced by population pressure 
and other sources of intensification is that of economic organization. The division of 
labor has fascinated economists since the time of Adam Smith, but was sidelined during 
the era of neoclassical economics. The theme of specialization has been resurrected, 
implicitly in endogenous growth theory and explicitly in the New Classical Economics 
(as in Yang, 2003). In Yang’s model, population growth lowers the relative price of 
labor, thereby increasing the use and number of intermediate capital goods, which are 
produced with labor. This in turn increases production and the number of manufactured 
goods, and further bolsters the value of total output through learning-by-doing. In this 
model, agricultural growth is only indirectly stimulated, for example through the lower 
cost of manufactured fertilizer – a land-saving input. 
Population growth can also facilitate specialization by lowering unit transaction 
costs. For example, the fixed costs of transport and communication infrastructure per 
capita may fall sufficiently to warrant additional infrastructure investment. Falling unit 
transaction costs, in turn, lower the friction that inhibits both horizontal and vertical 
specialization. In this case, learning-by-doing can directly bolster agricultural 
productivity. 
  A primary vehicle for increased specialization is hired labor. To see how 
population growth can induce hired labor, consider a hypothetical land-surplus economy 
wherein food is produced by family farms and where clearing costs are negligible. If we 
assume for the moment that output per hectare is a function of labor, farm size is 
efficiently determined where the marginal product of land is zero and the marginal 
product of labor is equal to the shadow price of household leisure. Once population 
growth brings lower quality, or sufficiently distant, land into production, intensification 
begins – lowering labor productivity. As the optimal land-to-labor ratio falls, the size of 
the average family farm declines. This process is efficiently halted, however, due to   9
indivisibilities such as those associated with ploughs and draft animals. Eventually, farm 
size shrinks to a point where the economies of scale lost from further shrinkage are just 
offset by the transaction costs of hired labor. At this fundamental turning point, increases 
in labor per hectare induced by population growth are accommodated by hired labor 
instead of falling farm size. In this sense, the change in agricultural organization – known 
as the emergence of the rural proletariat – is not necessarily an indication of exploitation 
or inefficiency. 
  But hired labor is not a perfect substitute for family labor. Transaction costs are 
different, and, since hired labor is not necessarily tied to a particular farm, it can 
specialize in particular skills instead of adjusting to the attributes of that farm. In the 
common case where family labor has a higher shadow price of leisure, hired labor has a 
comparative advantage in arduous and well-defined tasks wherein transaction costs are 
manageable (for instance, because the results of the work are readily observable) and 
wherein speed and quality are enhanced by training and repetition. Family members have 
a comparative advantage in management-intensive tasks such as chemical applications 
that require knowledge of farm attributes and for which shirking is harder to control. The 
advent of hired labor stimulates horizontal specialization across tasks, as with men in the 
Philippines who specialize in transplanting rice and move from village to village to do so. 
The resultant learning-by-doing increases productivity – for example, in producing 
straighter rows of rice, which raise the productivity of workers through the use of rotary 
weeders. Vertical specialization also increases. For example, landowners may specialize 
in land improvements, such as irrigation, and employ tenants who specialize in 
management-intensive labor and who employ and monitor workers who specialize in 
arduous and more easily supervised tasks.  
Further vertical and horizontal specialization is illustrated by the institution of 
piece-rate by teams. A team is hired to complete a task, such as transplanting, which is 
easily monitored by ex post inspection. In this sense, the task is equivalent to an 
intermediate good. The team may produce, for example, a stack of cane stalks that are of  
uniform length and ready for planting. Moreover, the team constitutes a separate firm. Its 
chief executive officer is the team manager, who contracts with the sugar grower and 
who bears the adverse reputational effects of any sub par performance. In this sense, the   10
capacity for specialization in industry may be quantitatively greater than that of 
agriculture but not necessarily qualitatively different. Thus it is neither inevitable that 
population growth decreases or increases productivity in an agricultural economy. 
The following stylized pattern of hired labor, based on Philippine rice farming in 
the 1960s to the 1980s, may serve to epitomize the evolution of specialization as labor 
intensification follows population growth. Once population density warrants clustered 
villages of farm families, the institution of exchange labor emerges for transplanting, 
harvesting, threshing, and often ploughing. Boserupian intensification increases the value 
of timeliness, and exchange labor allows these tasks to be completed in a day or less for 
one farm. The first widespread form of hired labor was for harvesting. Harvesters were 
paid a share of the harvest, typically one-sixth. This later evolved into the gama system, 
whereby a family or small group was assigned a portion of the farm to weed and later 
harvest, albeit for the same one-sixth share. This corresponded to a fall in wages relative 
to rents. In Java, Indonesia, where population pressure was even more intense, this same 
institution emerged – for the same one-sixth share – but the work requirement expanded 
even further, typically including transplanting. 
  When wage labor first appeared in Philippine rice farming, a given worker would 
typically perform a myriad of tasks over the cropping season. As intensification 
proceeded and the man-hours of hired labor increased, this undifferentiated wage-worker 
system was partially replaced by one involving specialized piece-rate workers who were 
paid according to their performance of a specific task. This evolved further into the piece-
rate-by-team system described above. As per-hectare yields continued to increase, piece-
rates were often converted back to wage contracts – due to the increased value of quality 
shirking – but task-by-task specialization was retained.  
A common assertion in development economics is that large farms that rely 
primarily on hired labor are at a transaction-cost advantage relative to small, family 
farms. This view implicitly takes the distribution over farm size as exogenous, however. 
In the efficiency view sketched above, farm size is endogenous and responds to changes 
in population. Indeed, efficient farm size may actually increase as the increased incidence 
of hired labor warrants new contracting institutions that lower transaction costs. The 
transaction costs that remain are the necessary cost of retaining economies of scale and   11
facilitating specialization. Whether productivity gains from specialization are enough to 
offset diminishing returns to more labor on a fixed amount of aggregate land cannot be 
determined a priori.  
The view that share tenancy is inefficient is similarly incomplete. In the canonical 
view, share contracts are a pair-wise efficient institution for mitigating both the labor-
shirking disadvantages of wage contracts and the risk-bearing disadvantages of rent 
contracts. Nonetheless, share tenancy is said to be socially inefficient because of the 
Marshallian labor shirking that remains under the common 50 per cent sharing. This view 
fails to explain how share tenancy fits into the evolution of agricultural organization in 
response to population pressure and other forces of intensification. Specialization is 
warranted by intensification and is facilitated by the evolution of contracts and other 
institutions. In particular, share tenancy facilitates vertical specialization between the 
landowner, the tenant, and the hired labor that the tenant supervises. It also facilitates the 
horizontal division of labor described above. On the other hand, share tenancy is 
primarily a type of family farm and may become less appropriate as agriculture becomes 
more capital-intensive. In any case, assessing the consequences of institutions without 
considering their causes, especially intensification, runs a risk of misplaced exogeneity. 
A third example of questionable exogeneity concerns the view that the 
modernization triad – population pressure, technical change and commercialization – has 
inevitably immiserizing consequences. The case made against the new varieties of rice 
and wheat that emerged in the mid- to late 1960s is illustrative. Modern rice varieties are 
said to be most profitable on irrigated, highly productive land and for farmers facing 
relatively low shadow prices of credit and close connections with the money economy.  
These characteristics tend to favour wealthy landowners over small farm families. As the 
rich get richer, small farmers and tenants are allegedly disenfranchised, thus accelerating 
Ricardian forces of population and polarizing society into a class of landlords and the 
proletariat. Commercialization further augments proletariatization, breaking down safety-
net customs such as gleaning rights for the poor, and setting the stage for violent conflict.  
The Boserupian and induced innovation perspectives provide a compelling counterweight 
to the neo-Marxian view. Technical change induced by population growth is primarily 
land-saving and offsets downward wage pressure, whereas Marxian technical change is   12
strongly labor-saving and exacerbates the downward effect of population. Like induced 
technical change, induced institutional change in the form of ‘commercialization’ has a 
positive effect on wages. The efficient emergence of landless workers helps to avoid the 
immiserizing effects that would occur from a growing population being accommodated 
by shrinking farm sizes. This class division in turn creates both a supply and a demand 
for hired labor. As labor markets emerge, new institutions such as piece-rate contracts 
and work teams with team leaders emerge to lower contracting costs, thereby lowering 
the transaction cost wedge between effective wage paid, including costs of recruitment, 
training and supervision, and effective wage received, net of the costs of search, required 
tools, and the journey to work. As the unit-transaction-cost wedge shrinks, workers move 
up their supply curves and employers down their demand curves for labor, resulting in 
more hired labor and increased net wages. From this perspective, induced innovation at 
least partially offsets the downward pressure that population pressure puts on wages. 
These efficiency patterns are by no means inevitable, but serve to counter the view that 
the modernization triad is inevitably impoverishing. The efficiency view also provides a 
theoretical starting point for explaining agricultural growth or the lack thereof. Rent-
seeking and policy distortions may induce arbitrary and inefficient patterns of ownership 
and farm size, thereby inhibiting the efficiency forces described. A challenge for 
economic historians and agricultural development theorists is to explain the political-
economy forces that have facilitated induced innovation in some cases and inhibited it in 
others. 
The positive Boserupian forces of induced innovation and specialization move in 
the opposite direction of the classical Malthusian effects. To summarize the above, even a 
small family farm can have four levels of vertical specialization – landowner, share-
tenant farm manager, work team leader, and worker – as well as horizontal specialization 
across the array of farm tasks. The advent of each new form of specialization can be 
modelled along the lines of Figure 1. Because of the non-convexity associated with the 
fixed cost of each advance in organizational complexity, population-induced 
specialization gives rise to increased labor productivity, but only over a limited range of 
additional labor. In the absence of other effects and changes, we would expect to see the 
marginal and average products of labor initially rising after each increase in   13
specialization; then, as labor per hectare increases further, to a decline until the next 
innovation is made. Adding learning-by-doing to the picture increases the chances of 
sustained productivity gains. Nonetheless, the theory cannot tell us whether the positive 
forces will outweigh the negative Malthusian forces in the long run.  
 
An historical perspective 
The history of agricultural growth is informative. As documented by Evans 
(1998), the long-run rate of agricultural growth closely matched that of population until 
1825, when world population reached one billion people. The corresponding increase in 
food production was almost entirely sourced in an increase in cultivated area, that is, it 
was extensive in nature. In contrast, since world population reached five billion late in the 
20th century, the increase in food production has been almost entirely driven by increased 
productivity. During the intervening period, when world population increased by four 
billion, growth in food production was increasingly intensive in nature (due to increased 
inputs) with increased productivity becoming more important as the period progressed. 
That is, as intensification led to diminishing returns, increased productivity became 
increasingly important.  
This broad-brush generalization about the nature of agricultural growth is 
consistent with the induced innovation perspective. As population growth increases land 
scarcity, the Ricardian gradient, which depicts the proportion of agricultural growth due 
to intensification, is monotonically rising. Intensification increases the relative scarcity of 
land further, relative to labor and capital, thus stimulating induced productivity increases, 
both from technical and institutional progress. Ironically, food supply has grown 
‘geometrically’ since 1938 (averaging 2.2 per cent per year) and population has grown 
nearly ‘arithmetically’ since 1959 (with one billion being added to world population 
roughly every 13.3 years). Technological and institutional change has seemingly inverted 
Malthusian theory. 
  This does not imply that all technological change is demand-induced. Even the 
theory of induced innovation admits supply-side innovations. For example, knowledge 
capital produced in the defence industry may lead to better communications technology. 
Irrigation systems in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt were presumably not induced by   14
increasing land scarcity but because someone figured out how to produce more with less. 
Economic history in the United States suggests that demand was partly induced by labor 
scarcity, but, once certain types of farm equipment had been invented, they were adapted 
even in areas where land prices were increasing faster than labor prices. Kremer (1993) 
even suggests that until the late 18th century the Malthusian argument was so 
predominant that population could be viewed as a proxy for technological change. 
  On the other hand, the agricultural and industrial ‘revolutions’ are now viewed 
less as bursts in productivity spurred by invention and more as induced technical change.  
For example, the four-field system, whereby wheat, barley, turnips and clover were 
grown in separate fields and rotated the following year, was once viewed as an essential 
part of the English agricultural revolution during the 18th century. But the system was 
developed in land-scarce Flanders two centuries before and popularized in England only 
once it was warranted by sufficient population-induced land scarcity.  
Even the mechanism of induced technical change is not entirely governed by 
factor prices, however. For example, the replacement of the fallow period in the medieval 
‘three field’ rotation by beans or another leguminous crop appears to have been indirectly 
induced by the population decline in 14th-century western Europe. Higher wages and 
farm incomes, resulting from the lower population and decreased land scarcity, increased 
the demand for meat. Complemented with the Flemish demand for wool, this incentivized 
farmers to increase sheep production, and they responded by both converting some lands 
to pasture and growing legumes in place of fallow on much of the remaining lands. 
  The extent to which technical change in English agriculture was induced has been 
the subject of intense historical debate. Historians reporting that agricultural productivity 
increased rapidly, say in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, tend to see an agricultural 
revolution stimulated by exogenous technical change. Economic historians who estimate 
productivity increases to be quite gradual view changes in rotation and other innovations 
as induced. As suggested by the discussion of Figure 1, induced changes do not by 
themselves reverse the price and income trends that induced them in the first place and 
therefore tend not to be associated with dramatic increases in productivity.  
 
Sustainable development   15
Resource depletion adds another negative dimension to the never ending debate 
between the development optimists and pessimists. Even before sustainable development 
became fashionable, neo-Malthusians argued that unbridled population growth in poor 
countries and economic growth in rich countries must inevitably cause severe pressure on 
the earth’s limited resources, resulting in burgeoning poverty and international conflict. 
The only solution was said to be the steady state economy with constant population, 
capital stock, and output. 
After the Brundtland Commission’s 1987 report, resource depletion was 
broadened to include pollution and other environmental threats. Environmental 
degradation, including increasing water scarcity, soil erosion, deforestation, 
desertification, salinization, and global warming, as well as diminishing energy and 
marine resources, was viewed as exacerbating the Malthusian vicious circle. 
Accordingly, the Brundtland Commission called for a simultaneous assault on population 
growth, poverty, and environmental degradation, thus giving rise to the modern 
movement for sustainable development. Economists have had limited success in 
modelling sustainable development, however. One notable review and synthesis (Arrow 
et al., 2004) was unable to settle on positive principles of sustainability and settled on the 
negative sustainability criterion – an injunction not to deplete the value of natural capital 
more than the additional value of produced capital. 
Even if we abstract from technical change, expanding models of economic growth 
to include environmental degradation does not produce a necessarily dismal outlook, 
however. If we represent concern for future generations by intergenerational neutrality 
and assume that population grows exponentially at a constant rate, optimal per capita 
consumption grows to its golden rule level, under plausible assumptions about 
substitutability, both between renewable and non-renewable resources and between 
natural and produced capital. Adding technical change provides even rosier possibilities 
(Weitzman, 1997). Whether these possibilities are realized depends largely on the 
effectiveness of private and public governance structures in facilitating specialization and 
exchange while guarding against unproductive rent seeking (Greif, 2006).  
 
The co-evolution of specialization and governance   16
The economic history of Hawaii provides a relatively recent, pre-industrial 
example of how specialization and governance in agriculture co-evolve with changes in 
population. During the ‘colonization’ period from AD 300–600, population growth, 
including further migration of Polynesian peoples, was slow. Agricultural expansion was 
extensive. The population began to increase more rapidly towards the latter part of the 
‘development’ period (600–1100), and agriculture began to intensify with the advent of 
irrigation. There was little if any division of labor among the commoners. During the 
expansion period (1100–1650) population accelerated and intensification greatly 
increased with a decreased fallow period, a major expansion in irrigation and with the 
development of fishponds. Horizontal specialization among workers became 
commonplace, with fishing more of a distinct occupation. Evolving from a system of 
somewhat separate extended families units, social and production relations became 
increasingly stratified, eventually with a distinct hierarchy from local chief upwards to 
governor (ali’i) of the watershed to district head (see Kirsch, 1985). 
This stylized history is suggestive of a governmental Kuznets curve. During the 
extensive (pioneer) stage of development, family or extended family units are largely 
autonomous and decision-making is decentralized accordingly. During the intensive 
development stage, decision-making and governance are centralized at a higher, albeit 
intermediate level (for example, communal governance of the commons). As 
intensification and specialization continue, efficiency favours a further centralization of 
governance, at least for the minimal functions of defence and the justice system, but a 
decentralization of decision-making as facilitated by private property. This last stage 
occurred in Hawaii after Western contact in 1778. New trade opportunities raised the 
value of irrigation and other investments in plantation agriculture, initially for sugar and 
later pineapple. Private property provided the assurance that planters needed to commit to 
these investments and also facilitated specialization between districts that was warranted 
by international trading opportunities. Graphing this historical progression of increasing 
governmental centralization on the horizontal axis, and rising and then falling 
centralization of decision-making on the vertical axis, completes the governmental 
Kuznets curve. Viewing government intervention in these two dimensions provides a   17
useful antidote to the misleading question of ‘how much government’ that sometimes 
arises in policy circles. 
 
Smith to Malthus to Solow 
A largely unexplored area of enquiry involves combining the theory of 
endogenous population growth with the theory of sustainable growth outlined above. 
Perhaps the simplest model of endogenous growth can be found in two-sector growth 
models of economic development wherein the birth rate is exogenous and the death rate 
declines to minimum as per capita income increases. The birth rate may also be made 
endogenous following the Chicago School’s new household economics. The increased 
opportunity cost of child care is one pervasive cause of the decline in fertility with 
economic development. Moreover, as the capital intensity of the economy increases, the 
returns to human capital are raised, thus creating incentives for families (individually or 
collectively) to invest in human capital, a partial substitute for increased fertility.  
Malthus’s emphasis on the supply of food determining population and Boserup’s focus 
on exogenous population growth increasing the demand for land and inducing supply-
side changes in agricultural production are clearly complementary. Focusing on one or 
the other is a device for dealing with the shortcomings of human imagination and the fact 
that models with both forces are indeterminate without further, possibly arbitrary, 
restrictions added to the model. Indeed, due to the endogeneity of population, enquiring 
into the impact of population levels involves something of a category mistake. In light of 
this, the World Bank statement (1984; see also Kelley, 1988)  that population growth in 
excess of two per cent per annum tends to have a negative impact on per capita income 
warrants reinterpretation. A more accurate statement would be that population growth in 
excess of two per cent tends to be associated with negative growth in per capita income 
after partially controlling for (imperfectly measured) positive effects. In particular, where 
high population growth occurs in the face of policy failures that cause an anti-labor bias, 
population growth tends to exacerbate the Brundtland vicious circle described above. 
More generally, the effects of population growth on agricultural and economic 
development may be different depending on the population density and the stage of 
economic development, as illustrated in Figure 2. For the early American frontier and for   18
parts of Africa today, physiological population density may be sufficiently sparse for 
Smithian economies of specialization and Boserupian economies in infrastructure to 
afford increasing labor productivity, as shown by the rising segment of the average 
product of labor curve. There is no labor market, at least in the sense of a competitive 
spot market, in such economies because paying labor its marginal product would more 
than exhaust total output. When the extensive land frontier nears economic exhaustion, 
population density becomes high, and the economy is still dominated by agriculture (as 
on the Indonesian island of Java in the 1960s and early 1970s), real wages fall, along with 
the average product of labor. Once the ‘structural transformation’ takes place, such that 
the growth rate of the agricultural labor force (if any) is but a small fraction of that of the 
industrial labor force, the marginal product of labor begins to rise, causing wage rates to 
rise and pulling up average labor productivity soon thereafter. Accumulation of produced 
capital and the relative increase of the industrial sector generate the transition to modern 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 2    Stages of economic development 
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These stages are not inevitable forces of history. Some economies may be able to 
bypass the Malthusian stage altogether. For example, economic policies in Taiwan during 
the 1950s and 1960s encouraged labor intensity in agriculture. This and the investments   19
in physical infrastructure, a gradual transition to processing and high value-added 
agricultural production and an efficient system of marketing cooperatives kept the 
demand for labor and wages rising. Hong Kong and Singapore were able to skip the 
Malthusian stage by early industrialization that relied on trade instead of the Johnston–
Mellor linkages  whereby agricultural development increases incomes thus stimulating 
demand for industrial products, mobilizes savings for industrial investments, and 
provides a market for manufactured farm inputs (Johnston, 1970).Korea was similarly 
able to bypass an extended Malthusian stage by allowing investment coordination 
through chaebols (business groups)and focusing on manufactured exports. In contrast, the 
negative force of policy failures can extend Malthusian involution and even prevent the 
transition to modern economic growth. Finally, because of policy failures and exogenous 
shocks, history may record more than two turning points. For example, after going 
through a Malthusian period during the ‘long 16th century’, wages in England rose 
between approximately 1640 and 1740, but then fell again before entering a ‘Solovian’ 
period of increase starting slightly after the advent of the 19th century and accelerating 
after the American Civil War. 
Nonetheless, we may meaningfully enquire into the mechanics of the two turning 
points shown, after abstracting from policy failures and exogenous shocks. While the first 
turning point has clear Ricardian underpinnings, the second has generated substantial 
controversy. How does an economy go from ‘Malthus to Solow?’ Forward linkages from 
agriculture are important in explaining the relative growth of industry, but they do not, in 
and of themselves, explain the rapid and sustained growth in labor productivity during 
modern economic growth.  
Note first that there is an implicit Kuznets curve corresponding to Figure 2. 
During the Malthusian period, wages fall and Ricardian rents increase, worsening income 
distribution. Even as industrialization begins to pull up wages, income distribution may 
continue to worsen for some time as the total returns to capital increase faster than the 
wage bill. Eventually, as the returns to human capital induce the substitution of ‘quality 
for quantity’ in fertility decisions, widely distributed human capital accumulates and even 
produced capital becomes less concentrated. These forces cause a more equal  income 
distribution in the model.   20
Were it only for Ricardian landlords accumulating an agricultural surplus and 
financing industrialization and the production of goods for a landed aristocracy, 
industrialization would have not have been as robust as that witnessed in modern 
economic growth. Indeed, increasing wages stifle the labor-intensive production that 
characterizes the early stages of industrialization, decrease the agricultural surplus, and 
detract from the rental incomes of capitalists and landlords that finance capital formation. 
What saves the day are the non-convexities inherent in industrialization. 
While there are numerous possibilities for specialization and other non-
convexities in agriculture, these are still few in comparison with those in industry. In 
industry, there is more horizontal specialization through proliferation in the number of 
products and more vertical specialization through multiple stages of intermediate 
production. In agriculture, the number of products is more limited, and vertical 
specialization without industry tends to be limited to separation of management and 
labor. With industry, agriculture can take advantage of land-saving intermediates such as 
fertilizer and tractors. Thus it is plausible that technological and institutional changes in 
agriculture have not been frequent enough to overcome the inexorable Malthusian force 
of increased food affording greater population growth.  
In contrast, once industry becomes a major part of the economy, non-convexities 
may be sufficiently compact in the course of development to dominate the negative force 
of lower death rates. The resultant increase in per capita income in turn invokes a positive 
feedback mechanism whereby Engel effects increase the demand for manufactures, thus 
increasing capital formation and the returns to human capital, thereby contributing to the 
decline in the demand for child numbers described above. Greater product specialization 
and falling unit transport costs afford a further inducement to international trade, an 
additional positive feedback mechanism. This theory supports the revisionist 
interpretation that the agricultural and industrial ‘revolutions’ were misreadings of a 
gradual process of economic change (see Clark, 2007). 
The role of industrial development in sustaining increased wages and per capita 
incomes does not imply that the appropriate development policy requires pushing 
industrial development while ‘squeezing’ or neglecting the agricultural sector. Indeed, for 
countries with a preponderance of the labor force in agriculture, economic development   21
can be sustained only by ‘pushing’ on the agricultural sector with R&D, infrastructure, 
and non-confiscatory prices (Pingali, 2006). It does mean, however, that stimulating the 
agricultural sector alone – that is, relying on automatic linkages from the agricultural to 
the industrial sector – is not sufficient for sustained economic development. External 
economies of labor-market pooling, human capital, technological spillovers and other 
network externalities imply that there are aspects of investment coordination that are not 
internalized by spot markets. This leaves an important role for government in facilitating 
the requisite economic cooperation.  
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